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ARE WE TO BE A NATION?"
FEDERAL POWER VS. "STATES' RIGHTS"

IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MARTIN

S. FLAHERTY**

INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago the United States won the Cold War. In the
words of President Bush, America had at last vanquished the
"evil empire" and now could create "a new world order."' The
long battle against communism did much to sustain the strong
national government forged during the New Deal and the Second World War. Internationally, the expansion of federal
power transformed the nation into the world's leading, and in
the end only, superpower. On the domestic front, the legacy
has been more mixed.2 Few thoughtful observers, however,
would dispute that at least one windfall of Cold War nationalism was to strengthen the federal government's hand in comembarrassments, not least
bating a range of regional
3
state-sanctioned racism.
Yet with victory comes spoils. The old habit of rallying
'round the flag has more and more given way to various retreats to isolationism. 4 This is no less true in constitutional

*

Cf. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & KIM RICE, ARE WE TO BE A NATION? THE

MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1987).

** Associate Professor & Co-Director, Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights, Fordham Law School; Visiting Professor of Constitutional Law at China University of Political Science and Law and at the National
Judges College, both in Beijing. My thanks to Curtis Bradley for reading an earlier draft from a critical perspective.
1. See George C. Wilson, Operation Highlights Weaknesses of U.S. Forces,
WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1991, at A23.

2.

Cold War era attacks on civil liberties, especially by the federal govern-

ment, offer the most obvious examples.

See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, CENTRAL

AMERICA AND THE LAW: THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE COURTS

45-58 (1988) (describing assaults on constitutional liberties related to foreign affairs concerns).
3. See Derek Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence

Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 371, 385 (1997) (commenting on U.S. resistance to international human
rights norms); Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66
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law. Withthe end-of the Cold War has come a fresh interest in
states' rights 5 that challenges not only settled understandings
secured by New Dealers, but also, in many ways, commitments
made by the Founders. The turn to states' rights has appeared
tentatively in United States Reports6 and more insistently in
the law reviews.

7

Some provocative scholars have even moved beyond domestic doctrine-the traditional forum of states' rights advocates-to expand the counterreformation to foreign affairs
powers-typically the domain of nationalists.8 The Supreme
Court, tentatively or not, has yet to endorse this type of proposal and so curtail Washington's foreign affairs power in deference to Trenton or Montgomery. Nonetheless, states' rights
advocates have already scored an important achievement. In
making federalism limits on foreign affairs authority a point of
discussion, the movement has, in a sense, won half the battle
by sidetracking serious commentators to take the time and effort to demonstrate that the received wisdom about the primacy of federal authority is indeed wise, or to demonstrate, as
Harold Koh recently put it, that "[a]s so often happens, the
hornbook rule... makes obvious sense."9
Yet nationalist advocates of common sense need not simply
go on the defensive. Nationalists have rightly argued that the
standard interpretive materials of text, structure, history, and
precedent demonstrate that the states' rights assault on federal
foreign affairs power is as baseless as it is retrograde. 10 But
they have yet, for the most part, to turn the tables and show
how settled understandings of federal foreign affairs authority
can undermine recent states' rights assertions in domestic law.

FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 572-78 (1997) (same); George Archibald, Past Dues Seen
Hurting U.S. Bid for Seat at U.N.; Abortion Issue Led to Veto of Measure to Pay
Bill, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A4 (reporting U.S. refusal to pay U.N. dues).
5. I employ this term more for its popular currency than for its theoretical
accuracy. As Charles Black used to note in his lectures, "rights" are more appropriately attributed to individuals rather than governmental units. See CHARLES
L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED & UNNAMED
41-85 (1997).
6. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 26.
8. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
9. Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1824, 1825 (1998).
10. See infra Part II.B.
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The possibilities are only' now coming- into view." One
area in which recent states' rights activism appears especially
vulnerable is the doctrine that the federal government may not
"commandeer" state executive officials to implement national
policy, a prohibition newly minted in New York v. United
States12 and expanded in Printz v. United States. 3 These
holdings deftly sought to protect state governments from federal "intrusion" on the ground that the national government
lacked the power to direct state officials rather than-what
would have been more difficult doctrinally-on the basis that
the states' sovereignty protected them from otherwise legitimate federal assertions. 14 This move, however, exposes the
new prohibition against commandeering to still-settled commitments to national power that run even more deeply than
related skepticism about state sovereignty. In particular, the
Court's rationale subjects the rule against commandeering to
national foreign affairs authority classically set forth in Missouri v. Holland, 5 in which Justice Holmes declared that the
federal government could take action in the name of the treaty
power that it might not be able to undertake through its domestic authority. 6 Given that all these cases remain good law,
there is nothing to prevent Congress from, for example, directing local law enforcement checks of gun purchasers pursuant to
a treaty or executive agreement, even though the Court held in
Printz that the federal government lacks exactly this power
7
when acting under its domestic authority.
Of course, it may be objected that evolving states' rights
understandings dictate that Holland itself should be overruled
One scholar has suggested as much, at least in part. 8 Yet this
is where turning the tables operates on a deeper level. The
states' rights assault on foreign affairs understandings has
typically sought to subject such leading cases as Holland to
close scrutiny in order to prove that expansive views of foreign

11.

See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST,

COMMENTARY 33 (1997).

12. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
13. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
14. See id.; 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
15. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
16. See id.
17. See 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
18. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97
MICH. L. REV. 390, 458-61 (1998).
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affairs authority often rest upon a basic notion of foreign affairs
"exceptionalism." 19 Yet once such novel holdings as New York
and Printz are exposed to the same harsh light, a different picture becomes clear. The bases for the Court's recent states'
rights efforts begin to appear as problematic as they are novel.
By comparison, the common-sense defense of settled foreign affairs understandings looks far more sensible, not to mention
more faithful to constitutional text, structure, and history.
This more thoroughgoing analysis thus offers a basis to refute
charges of exceptionalism. In this the following critique is part
of a larger project.
Accordingly, this article considers the rule against commandeering both on the level of doctrine and interpretation. It
argues that federal foreign affairs authority does and should
trump the prohibition against the national government enlisting state officials. Part I reviews the Court's revival of states'
rights with a special eye on New York and Printz. It first focuses on how the shortcuts these cases take around unfavorable precedents subject them to established foreign affairs
jurisprudence. This part then critiques the proffered bases for
the Court's states' rights stance. Part II turns to foreign affairs
jurisprudence, including not just Holland but such complementary cases as Reid v. Covert.s0 Here the analysis first seeks to
show the newfound relevance of such cases and then defend
their ongoing legitimacy. The article concludes by noting that
every now and again constitutional doctrine and interpretation
point in the direction of the more normatively appealing of two
alternatives. This is one of those instances.

19. See id. at 461.
20. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).

ARE WE TO BE A NATION?
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THE ASSAULT ON FEDERAL POWER 21

I.

A.

The "Rebirth"of Federalism

The Supreme Court's recent turn to federalism is itself
part of a larger story with more than a touch of irony. For at
least the past two decades, the Court has flirted with a number
of doctrines associated with the Founding, sometimes involving
rights, such as takings jurisprudence;2 2 more often involving
matters of governmental structure such as separation of powers and federalism. Not for nothing did the Federalist Society 23-a group ostensibly dedicated to returning to the original
understanding of the Constitution-devote a recent annual
meeting to the topic of "The Rebirth of the Structural Constitution."24 The Court's dalliance with separation of powers has
been longstanding but uneven.25 By contrast, the "rebirth" of
federalism has been more recent, yet steadfast. 26 The two lines
of case law nonetheless have much in common, not least of
which is a fidelity to constitutional text, structure, and original

21. The material in this part is taken from a critique of modern federalism
jurisprudence that appears in Martin S. Flaherty, "American"Federalism:A Doctrine Better Shipped Overseas?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN EVOLUTION (Roger Goebel ed., forthcoming

1999). For an excellent complementary critique, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism:Why State Autonomy Makes Sense
and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1997). I am indebted to
Professor Gerald Neuman for bringing this article to my attention.
22. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); see also William
Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
23. See Fidelity Through History: Colloquy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693, 1697
(1997) (discussing the Federalist Society's misappropriation of James Madison as
its "iconographic figure").
24. See Symposium, Reviving the Structural Constitution: The Seventeenth
Annual National Student FederalistSociety Symposium on Law and Public Policy-1998, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1-245 (1998).

25. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1724, 1732-38 (1995) (summarizing this history).
26.

See Symposium, Federalism in the 21st Century, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 971-

1274 (1997); see also Martin S. Flaherty, More Apparent Than Real: The Revolutionary Commitment to ConstitutionalFederalism,45 U. KAN. L. REV. 993, 993-94
(1997).
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meaning that, for a Court ostensibly committed to judicial re27
straint, is more apparent than real.

1.

The Reach of Federal Power

As to federalism, Justice O'Connor aptly observes that
"[t]hese questions can be viewed in either of two ways." 28 Term
the first approach "distributive federalism." Here the issue
turns on the division of powers between the federal and state
governments over public or private activity. More specifically,
in these cases "the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress
in Article I of the Constitution." 29 A quirky yet classically
American illustration of this analysis appears in Federal Baseball Club v. National League.30 In that case, Justice Holmes
held that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate major league baseball almost literally on the
grounds that "[t]he business is giving exhibitions of base ball,
31
which are purely state affairs."
Today, of course, the result in Federal Baseball seems as
distant as the legal spitball.12 Since then, of course, the Court
increasingly weighed in on the side of federal power. This
trend famously accelerated during the New Deal, when hold34
ings such as Wickard v. Filburn33 and United States v. Darby
transformed the Commerce Clause into a virtual blank check

27. See generally Flaherty, supra note 26. On the lack of support for the
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence, especially with regard to history, see
Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1742-44.
28. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).
29. Id.
30. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
31. Id. at 208.
32. Except, anomalously, with regard to baseball itself. The time is long
past when any serious observer would consider major league baseball to be a
purely local activity beyond the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to overrule FederalBaseball,
largely out of a concern for reliance interests. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
282 (1972). Major league baseball outlawed the spitball in 1920, though it did
provide a "grandfather" clause for pitchers then practicing the art. See DAVID
NEMEC, THE RULES OF BASEBALL 44-45 (1994) (discussing Rule 3.02, which outlawed the spitball). For an original discussion of Federal Baseball, see G.
EDWARD WHITE, CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL TRANSFORMS
ITSELF, 1903-1953, at 69-81 (1996).
33. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
34. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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for national authority, and again when later decisions such as
Perez v. United States35 and Katzenbach v. McClung3 6 extended
federal commerce power still further. Since the New Deal, the
Court has struck down only one federal statute as exceeding
that seemingly limitless power.
But there is the one. The Court recently showed its first
sign of reviving distributive federalism in United States v. Lopez.37 In that case, the Court held-by now famously as wellthat a provision of the "Gun-Free School Zones Act" that prohibited possession of a firearm within 200 yards of a primary or
secondary school exceeded Congress's reach under the Commerce Clause. 38 Whether Lopez is the beginning of a reverse
trend remains to be seen.
2.

The Scope of "State Sovereignty"

The second inquiry-less important in practice but more
prominent in recent case law-might best be termed "sovereignty federalism." Here the analysis assumes that the states
themselves enjoy an immunity from power that the federal
government may otherwise exercise over private activity. As
Justice O'Connor put it, in these cases "the Court has sought to
determine whether an Act of Congress invades the province of
state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment" 39 or some
other constitutional source. In National League of Cities v.
Usury,40 for example, the Court held that Congress could not
regulate the wages and hours of municipal transit workers,
even though employees of a private transportation company
41
would have been fair game.
The idea of sovereignty federalism took longer to fade. Not
42
until Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
did the Court announce that it was getting out of the business
43
of shielding state governments against federal intrusion.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
.40.

402 U.S. 146 (1971).
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See id. at 567-68.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
41. See id. at 851-52.
42. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
43. See id.
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Overruling National League of Cities, Garcia left the fate of the
states to the political processes in Washington, D.C., 44 where
they ostensibly enjoyed various built-in advantages such as
equal suffrage in the Senate. 45 At most, the Court hinted, it
might step in if Congress directly intruded on core features of
self-governance.46
Yet just as sovereignty federalism was quicker to decline
than distributive federalism, it has been quicker to revive. The
turnabout began with the (then) little-noted Gregory v. Ashcroft
decision. 47 There the Court held that Congress could not regulate "core" state functions-in this case a prohibition against
age discrimination as it applied to state supreme court
judges-unless it plainly (and specifically) expressed such an
intent in the text of the statute. 48 New York effectively raised
the sovereignty hurdle in holding that Congress could not
"commandeer" states to implement federal programs no matter
how plain the statutory intent.49 It should come as no surprise
that the Court has meanwhile reinforced the transformation of
the Eleventh Amendment from a text originally understood to
advance its plain meaning of limiting federal court jurisdiction
into one more state sovereignty shield.50
The Court's most far-reaching exercise in sovereignty federalism came with Printz. At specific issue was a provision of
the Federal Gun Control Act requiring local law enforcement
officers to run background checks on certain categories of gun
purchasers. Though this sort of arrangement is standard practice in the European Union, 51 the Court rejected federal use of

44. See id. at 556-57.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; id. art. V.
46. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
47. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
48. See id. at 467.
49. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
50. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). On the history of
the Eleventh Amendment, see William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof
the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather Than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033
(1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
51. In the sense of the European Union "commandeering" the executive officials of the Member States. See Koen Lenaerts, Federalism:Essential Concepts in
Evolution-The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 765-66
(1998).
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municipal officials in the United States. 52 Printz defended this
result by pushing an analytic envelope introduced in New
York.5 3 There, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion noted that,
in certain cases, the distributive and sovereignty inquiries are
"mirror images of each other." 4 By this, the Justice meant that
the distribution of power to the federal government runs out at
just the point where a sovereignty shield arises, when the
authority under consideration is a congressional power to
commandeer state governmental operations. 55 This symmetry
notwithstanding, New York proceeded to discuss matters
purely in distributive terms-that is, whether Congress has the
power to commandeer. 56 The majority may have taken this
route because there were still not enough votes to overturn
Garcia and bring back a National League of Cities-style sovereignty shield directly. This astute tactical move, however,
should not obscure the doctrinal effect. The New York approach in reality sounded in sovereignty rather than distribution for the simple reason that a "power to commandeer
states"-unlike authority to regulate hours and wages--can
only affect states. In this way, the analysis ultimately turned
on a trait that only states can possess, an attribute that by any
other name would still amount to sovereignty. Perhaps for this
reason Printz itself spent far less time wrapping a similar sovereignty result in distributive rhetoric.
By contrast, Printz could not have been more straightforward about the constitutional sources it relied on for the result
it reached. Justice Scalia's majority opinion followed the
course of its immediate predecessors in considering the basic
interpretive troika of constitutional text, structure, and history
as the means to rein in judicial caprice. Printz further followed
its siblings by making history the first among equals of the
bases for resurrecting state sovereignty limits.

52. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
53. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
54. Id. at 156.
55. Again focusing on the Tenth Amendment, the Court explained, "[i]f a
power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a
power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress." Id. This analysis contrasts with the usual Garcia situation, in which the reach of federal authority to
regulate a matter directly is conceded, but for an arguable sovereignty barrier.
56. See id. at 161-66.

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
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B. "[Clonstitutional[R]eview, [Niot [Judicial

57
[L]awmaking, [Is a [Clourt's[Blusiness [H]ere."

The problem is that none of these sources yields the federalism answers that the Court projects onto them. To the contrary, their very thinness reveals that many of the same
8
Justices who ordinarily rail against "government by judiciary"5
concerning rights engage in just such "activism" with regard to
federalism. On this score, the main failing with Printz's otherwise cogent dissents is that they did not fully expose just how
weak the majority's rationale was. A critique sufficient to the
task must await a more lengthy venue. The following sketch
attempts a first step.
First, consider text. Not even the Printz majority was so
bold as to rely on any specific language for its holding. Nor
could it. Justice Scalia-otherwise known for his reliance on
what the Constitution expressly states-admitted that "there is
no constitutional text speaking to this precise question."5 9
Nothing approaching a prohibition against federal direction of
state executive officers to implement federal law appears anywhere in the document.
To the contrary, when the Constitution does address the
issue more generally, it undercuts state sovereignty in unambiguous terms. As the Supremacy Clause famously states, federal law shall be "the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."60 Ignoring the thrust of this provision, the Printz
majority somewhat half-heartedly attempted to draw the negative inference that an express statement binding state judges
to federal law implicitly freed state officers from the same
duty. 61 As textual exegesis, the attempt failed on several
grounds. For one, the document's breadth and terseness make

57. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 768 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANsFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (Liberty Fund 1997) (1977).
59. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
60.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

61. In fairness, the majority here places greater emphasis on drawing negative inference from early congressional practice rather than relying on textual inference pure and simple. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
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the technique misleading at least as often as not. Elsewhere,
the same Supremacy Clause states that only "Laws of the
United States" be made "in pursuance" of the Constitution,
without mentioning any similar limitation about treaties, 62 yet
the Supreme Court long ago properly rejected as ahistorical
and absurd the idea that treaties could therefore amend the
Constitution.6 3 For another reason, the Court's dalliance with
negative inference presupposed a crisp, widespread underexecutive power,
standing of the boundaries of judicial and
64
which simply was not the case at the time.
Just as the majority could not resort to specific text, neither could it rely on more general language. To paraphrase
Justice Scalia's observation about a woman's right to an abortion, the Constitution says "absolutely nothing"65 about state
sovereignty. At no point does the document employ the term.66
This absence is especially glaring in the Tenth Amendment,
the text most often said to mandate substantive sovereignty
limitations. It may be that this Amendment, in providing that
powers not delegated to the national government were reserved
to the states, merely captures the same idea in language more
distinctive to the time. But here consider Article II of the Articles of Confederation, that framework's first substantive provision and the Tenth Amendment's immediate precursor. Article
II stated that "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdictionand right, which is
not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled." 67 Nothing pertaining to state
"freedom," "independence," "jurisdiction," "right,"-or "sovereignty"-survived in the journey from the Articles to the Bill of
Rights. For all that negative inference is a risky business, it
would appear least dangerous when juxtaposing parallel provi-

62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
63. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
64. See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1774-78.
65. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., con-

curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the

States respectively or to the people.").
67.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (emphasis added).
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sions addressing precisely the same subject matter-especially
68
when the contemporaries themselves made the connection.
Bereft of text, the Printz majority turned "to consideration
of the structure of the Constitution to see if [it could] discern
among its 'essential postulate[s]' . . . a principle that controlled
the present cases."69 Printz and its siblings made a great deal
of the structural fact that the Constitution clearly presupposes
two levels of government, federal and state. Yet Printz itself
never delivered the structural analytic goods, except perhaps of
the conclusory sort. 70 At no point did the majority explain why
the existence of two levels of government means-or even implies-that the higher unit cannot commandeer the personnel
of the subunit.
Nor could it do this any more than it could rely on specific
text. To cite one obvious case, every state in the Union establishes at least a lower tier of county government, yet no one infers from this structural fact a necessary prohibition against
state commandeering of local personnel.71 It may be objected
that this sort of example misleads, since counties, as creations
of states, have no claim to any attribute of sovereignty in contrast to the states themselves. Just here, however, comparative law comes to the rescue with an even more dispositive
illustration. The European Union not only may, but most often
does, implement its policies precisely through the commandeering of Member State officers.7 2 Why this bedrock practice
of European law can thrive in a two-tier structure that includes
truly sovereign nation-states but must be ruled out of bounds
in a two-tier structure of states that are, at best, quasisovereign is not immediately apparent. Perhaps for this reason, Printz reads as if the less actually said about structure the
better, and proceeds directly to the ostensible historical understanding of what the federal-state structure ostensibly implies.

68. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 767, 767-78 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)
(Motion of Elbridge Gerry, House of Representatives).
69. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
70. The same holds for the other sovereignty federalism decisions. See, e.g.,
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157-59, 174-77 (1991); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1990).
71. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. XI (outlining powers and obligations of
Montana local governments).
72. See Lenaerts, supra note 51, at 765-66.
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Printz confirms that history has become the first refuge of
the judicial activist. In recent years, appeals to the original
understanding of the Founders have served as the main source
for the Court's decisions dealing with such structural doctrines
as separation of powers.7 3 Comparable turns to history have
been no less prominent in the Court's attempts to resuscitate
federalism. 74 In these and other areas, the Court has had little
difficulty finding that the past yields crisp and clear Founding
attitudes that provide a basis for denying Congress powers it
might otherwise exercise. In the area of separation of powers,
these Founding principles tend to protect the President. In the
area of federalism, they shield the states.
Printz is no exception. Absent material analysis of text
and structure, history provides the only direct source of constitutional meaning that the Court-or at least the current
Court-has left. 75 Oddly, Justice Scalia devoted the bulk of his
attention in Printz to a discussion of early congressional practice. Only then did the majority consider, and then in a somewhat disjointed manner, what for originalists is the logically
prior and more probative issue of the Founders' understanding
76
about the matter at the time of the Framing and ratification.
As for the evidence that constitutes original understanding, strictly speaking, the Court advanced two basic contentions, either one of which might be the subject of a lengthy
monograph. More generally it argued that the Founders' presumed that the states, in establishing the federal government,
conferred upon Congress certain discrete, limited powers and
reserved other key aspects of their sovereignty such as the inviolability of their borders. 77 The Court supported this account
of residual sovereignty mainly through reliance on certain constitutional provisions and its own precedents. 78 As for the
commandeering 'issue itself, the majority contended that the
"Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation had

73. See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1732-44.
74. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 155, 157, 162-66; Gregory, 501 U.S. at
457-59.
75. In addition, the Court also turns to the indirect source of previous case
law. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-31 (1997).
76. This discussion takes up the middle portion of the opinion's Part II and
then the so-called structural analysis of Part III. See id. at 910-15, 918-25.
77. See id. at 918-19.
78. See id.
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persuaded them that using the States as instruments of federal
governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federalstate conflict, 7 9 at least absent state consent. 80 This point
rested mainly on the Court's analysis of apparently contrary
passages in the tried and true Federalist Papers as well as,
once more, the Court's own previous historical forays.
The majority nonetheless clearly believed that its true historical trump emerged from the Republic's early practice after
the Constitution was ratified. "If," the opinion asserted, "earlier Congresses avoided the use of this highly attractive power,
we would have reason to believe that the power was thought
not to exist."81 By the end of this discussion, what began as a
potential "reason to believe" transmogrified into a dispositive
rationale whereby congressional failure to commandeer state
officers became a bar to exercising the option at any point under any circumstances. As the majority seemed to concede,
such conclusive reliance on negative inference makes sense
only if, first, Congress never actually employed the power at issue; and second, if the historical context demonstrates that this
same power was so "highly attractive"8 2 that no explanation
other than a consensus that the Constitution prohibited its use
appears plausible. The Court took up the first challenge, arguing that the numerous early federal statutes that direct state
officials to implement national policy "establish, at most, that
the Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges"8 rather than executive officers. So far as context goes, Justice Scalia relied mainly on
the assertion that the power to commandeer was "highly attractive"-this despite his later point that exactly this device
had proven "ineffective and provocative of federal-state con84
flict."

Providing an adequate critique of even an inadequate historical account presents the same challenge as coming up with
an adequate historical account in the first place. Either project
will usually require more time and space than the deficient ap-

79. Id. at 919.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 909-11.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 919.
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peal to the past under consideration.8 5 The best that can be offered here is an overview that may serve as a guide for a more
detailed assessment down the line. As it happens, the Printz
majority's history is so wanting that even a short prolegomenon
should demonstrate that as often as not, the Court selects the
helpful portions of the record and ignores the rest, projects the
desired modern ideology onto the sources, or simply makes
things up.
Contrary to originalism's first article of faith, the history of
the Founding tends to leave open as many questions as it settles. Nowhere may this be more true than concerning original
meanings of the federal structure. As I have attempted to
show elsewhere, the Founding generation may have agreed on
few specifics regarding such other structural mechanisms as
separation of powers, but at least it shared a basic commitment
to that doctrine's principal goals.8 6 Not even this degree of
agreement characterizes federalism. Instead, the Founders'
views on the subject ranged from the arch-nationalism of Alexander Hamilton to the localism of Antifederalists such as Patrick Henry, with James Madison in between-far closer to
Hamilton at this stage in his career-but not exactly in the
middle. 87 The noted historian Jack Rakove has described the
resulting understandings: "Within the language of the Constitution, as it turned' out, there was indeterminacy enough to
confirm that both Federalists and Antifederalists were right in
predicting how tempered or potent a government that Convention had proposed." 88 That said, the Constitution's leading
supporters generally began with a premise of shared "misgivings about the capacities of state government," 89 misgivings
that they, at best, grudgingly accommodated.
Yet true to most originalists-or at least those whom
James Fleming has usefully termed "narrow originalists" 9 0-

85. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" and Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 555-56 (1995).
86. See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1755-810.
87. For a recent authoritative overview, see JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 161-202

(1996).
88. Id. at 201.
89. Id. at 162.
90. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1997); see also James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative
Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995).
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Justice Scalia appears to assume that just about everyone in
the Founding generation, but for a few renegades, agreed on
key points. The Printz opinion, for example, boldly asserted
that on the subject of federal commandeering of state officers,
"it was Madison's-not Hamilton's-[view] that prevailed... at
the Constitutional Convention and in popular sentiment," offering neither specific support nor any criteria for what would
count as prevailing in popular sentiment. 9' Especially with regard to federalism, such bald statements at worst point in the
92
wrong direction and at best are woefully simplistic.
Even on these terms, the Printz Court's originalism tended
toward the worst. Recall the majority's preliminary presumption that the states established a federal government of carefully circumscribed powers, a trope that underlies other areas
of recent jurisprudence as well. 93 However carefully or not
these powers were circumscribed, virtually no serious historian
would today argue that the Founders stood united on the belief
that the states as sovereign entities created the government of
the United States. To the contrary, modern scholarship on the
period emphasizes the mistrust of the state governments that
led the Federalists to bypass them through the ratification
conventions, to say nothing of proposing the new federal Con-

91. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997). Justice Scalia's
reliance on Clinton Rossiter and Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention at
best supports the commonly known proposition that Hamilton was comparatively
far more nationalistic than most of the other Founders, not that his views on the
commandeering of state executive officials failed to "prevail." See CLINTON
ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 44-47, 194, 196 (1964);
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 366 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).

92. The majority's reductionism amidst the Founding's complexity enables it
to ignore the very real question of who in the past should count when there exist
many contradictory voices. One option would look to a simple majority (or supermajority?) understanding of the American populace when a relevant text was ratified. Another possibility would be to rely on the evidently more deliberative
analyses of the Madisons, Wilsons, and Hamiltons (not to mention Binghams and
Roosevelts). Still another tack might look to the general direction given constitutional solutions suggest, along with any limiting principles, in light of the types of
problems which a given provision or doctrine addressed as well as its internal
logic. This greatly undertheorized area takes on greater importance in matters
such as this in which the Founding generation was almost literally all over the
chart. Perhaps needless to say, the majority nowhere considers either this problem or the possibilities. For a thoughtful discussion on different historical viewpoints and sources, see RAKOVE, supra note 87, at 3-22.
93. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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stitution in the first place. 94 Typical is Gordon Wood's observation that: "Only by shifting the arena of reform to the federal
level, it seemed, could the evils of American politics be finally
remedied." 95 In contrast to his modern counterparts, an earlier
Justice anticipated this interpretation, perhaps because he
lived through the process. "The government proceeds directly
from the people; is 'ordained and established' in the name of
the people," wrote Chief Justice John Marshall, which, his reliance on the Preamble makes clear, means "the people" of the
United States. 96 As he famously continued:
The assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a Convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect
liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by
the State governments. The [C]onstitution, when thus
adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State
sovereignties.... The powers delegated to the State sover-

eignties were to be exercised by themselves, not by a distinct
and
independent
sovereignty, created by
themselves.... The government of the Union, then.., is,

emphatically, and truly, a government of the people.97

94. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 142-83 (1987);
EDMUND

S.

MORGAN,

INVENTING

THE

PEOPLE:

THE

RISE

OF

POPULAR

SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 267-77 (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE

CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 463-67, 519-36 (1969).
These and other historians, moreover, tend to assume that the Founders took the
Preamble at face value and assumed that the ratification conventions spoke cumulatively in the name of "We the People of the United States," not of the several
states. For an alternative view on this point, see Henry Paul Monaghan, We the
People[s],Original Understanding,and ConstitutionalAmendment, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 121 (1996).
95. WOOD, supra note 94, at 463.
96. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
97. Id. at 404-05. Coming from the opposite, Antifederalist end of the political spectrum, Patrick Henry earlier made the same point more succinctly, asking:
"[WIhat right had [the Framers of the Constitution] to say, We, the People....
[W]ho authorised them to speak the language of We, the People, instead of We, the
States?" Patrick Henry, Patrick Henry's Opening Speech: A Wrong Step Now and
the Republic Will Be Lost Forever, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION 595, 596 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
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Marshall's is not the only plausible account, then9" or
now. 99 As a significant, if not dominant, contemporary understanding, the Printz Court ignored it at the risk of appearing
ignorant at best, result-oriented at worst.
The majority fared only slightly better with its other originalist point about the perceived liabilities of federal commandeering.
As noted, Printz contended that the Founders'
experience under the Articles convinced them that using state
officers to implement federal policy was not only ineffective,
but provoked federal-state conflict as well. This supposition
does not necessarily conflict with the Federalist mistrust of
state government that is the cornerstone of recent scholarship.
But it is a large additional step to conclude that the Federalists, or Founders generally, would forego the option altogether.
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia offered no direct evidence
of an understanding that the Constitution somehow made federal authority over the states the price to be paid for federal
authority over individuals. 10 0 The closest he came was an ear-

98. Madison suggested that:
[I]t appears on the one hand that the Constitution is to be founded on
the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies
elected for the special purpose; but on the other, that this assent and
ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one
entire nation; but as composing the distinct and independent States to
which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of
the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the
authority of the people themselves. The act therefore establishing the
Constitution will not be a national but a federal act.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 253-54 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Madison's exact views on federalism, at least in FederalistNo. 39, were so complex as to be obscure. See RAKOVE, supra note 87, at 162. Note further that even
here Madison was careful to distinguish between the states as embodied by special conventions of the people, as creators of the Constitution, from the states as
represented by ordinary state government. See id. at 244 (elaborating this point).
This matters for the reason that the Founders, dissatisfied with the existing state
governments, resorted to such conventions in the first place-such special bodies
were more likely to accord power to the federal government than were the state
legislatures. In failing to make this distinction, the Printz Court's repetition of
the "We the States" theory implies a far more state-oriented result.
99. See Monaghan, supra note 94.
100. The majority offers no evidence, that is, apart from two out-of-context
quotations, including one from the same Alexander Hamilton whom the opinion
asserts did not prevail on this issue. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
919-20 (1997) (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 91, at 9); THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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lier discussion of several passages from the FederalistPapers
that expressly state that the federal government will be able to
make use of state officers for various purposes. 1 1 Justice
Scalia got around these embarrassing statements with the
novel contention that none of them necessarily implies "that
Congress could impose these responsibilities without the consent of the States."10 2 This "implied consent" proviso, which
supposedly clarifies the passage, apparently rests on the assumption that the Founders rejected federal commandeering,
which is the very point that the passages are employed to demonstrate in the first place. Perhaps a better way to avoid such
circularity would be to rely on a contextual point that is clearly
demonstrable, namely, the Federalists' contempt for the recent
record of the state legislatures. In this light, it makes far more
sense to read the FederalistPapers as meaning what they say,
and so leaving the possibility of using state officers in certain
instances to the better-framed federal government.
Specific evidence, moreover, corroborates the point. Patrick Henry, for example, inveighed against the specter of state
agents collecting state and federal taxes. 10 3 Henry's remarks
clearly assume that the federal government would have the
power to commandeer state officials in that most inflammatory
of executive functions. Given his horror at the prospect, not
even Justice Scalia would be able to project an "implied consent" proviso here. This is not to say that this passage proves
that the Founders all shared Henry's view. Comments directly
on point are simply too few and far between. And even more
than most Antifederalists, Henry tended to puff up federal
powers, the better to stoke opposition to the proposed Constitution. That said, Henry's assumption-which all of the Justices
somehow missed-does square with what we know of the
Founding's context, comports with the more natural reading of
the contested passages of The Federalist,and at the very least

101. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 911.
102. Id. at 910-11.
103. See Patrick Henry, Patrick Henry Replies to Governor Randolph, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 97, at 635. Earlier in
the same speech, Henry considered the possibility of two sets of tax collectors,
Federal and state, to rail against the potential expense: "Double sets of collectors
will double the expense." Id. at 633. Henry, however, also took at face value the
contention, which he attributed to the Federalists, that "one collector may collect
the Federal and State taxes," and assumed that such a person would be the local
"Sheriff." Id. at 635.
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challenges the Court's implication of a Founding consensus on
the power at issue.
Similar problems plague treatment of early practice. Recall here that the Printz majority relied on the negative inference that failure to use such a highly attractive mechanism
means repudiation. Like all negative inferences, it is another
leap to argue that failure to utilize a power means affirmative
repudiation of it. Yet ignore this and for the moment concede
that no such statutes were enacted, other than those pertaining
to the judiciary. That still leaves the contextual problem of
10 4
showing that commandeering was so "highly attractive."
Here again, the Printz Court supplied no evidence for this contention-and here again ignored the demonstrated contextual
point of abhorrence of the states. It is on such shaky foundations that the Court's recent and innovative attempts to construct sovereignty federalism barriers proceed.
II.

THE PERSISTENCE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

A. Foundationsof ForeignAffairs
However dubious the state sovereignty crusade may be
domestically, doubly radical are attempts to extend it to foreign
affairs. Here such attempts proceed despite case law that is
not only well settled, but which has yet to be questioned even
by the present activist Court. They go forward, moreover, even
though the federal primacy that the settled case law establishes-if not always the reasoning of such case law-passes
interpretive muster far more convincingly than the domestic
sovereignty innovations on which they rely. So radical is the
campaign that it even means to outdo previous eras when
states' rights notions truly ruled by rolling back federal foreign
affairs authority that flourished at the time and that the Court
recognized as a corrective to overly expansive states' rights doctrine in the first place.
In this light, at least the "commandeering" component of
the state sovereignty project falls victim to its own cleverness.
As with domestic authority, foreign affairs law draws a basic
distinction between the reach of federal power and limits on
power already determined. The outcome on either side of this
104. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
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distinction, however, is comparatively more nationalist. As for
power, what the established case law establishes is that the
reach of federal power in foreign affairs extends beyond what it
may be domestically. Conversely, what limits have been recognized turn on the rights of individuals, not the sovereignty of
state governments, an aspect of foreign affairs doctrine conspicuous by its absence. Since New York and its progeny are
couched in terms of federal power, or lack of it, they invite
analysis of whether the federal government can commandeer
state officers in the name of its more extensive authority in foreign affairs. If, despite the Court's own rhetoric, commandeering doctrine is treated as a sovereignty barrier, it at best
remains debatable whether limits that pertain to the nation's
internal affairs apply to its external concerns.
1.

The (Further) Reach of Federal Power

The foreign affairs counterpart to FederalBaseball is Holland. Both decisions appeared shortly after the First World
War, a period well before federalism "began to be a wasting
force in U.S. life generally." 10 5 Both cases feature a majority
opinion of the Court by Holmes that was typically terse and
grandiloquent. Most importantly, Holland, like the baseball
case, sounds primarily in distributive federalism.
Here the similarities end. As noted, Federal Baseball illustrates the restrictive view that any number of cases accorded grants of federal power in domestic affairs prior to the
New Deal.' The Holmes of Holland famously offered a very different perspective on federal authority, in foreign affairs. The
well-known facts of the case could scarcely furnish a sharper
contrast. On the domestic front, two lower federal courts invalidated a 1913 federal act regulating the hunting of migratory birds 10 6 on the grounds "that Congress had no power to
displace" state authority in this area. 107 As an end run around
this problem, the federal government concluded a treaty with
the United Kingdom under which the United States and Can-

105. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
CONSTITUTION 149 (2d ed. 1996).

AFFAIRS

AND

THE

UNITED

STATES

106. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United
States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
107. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
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ada would enact statutes regulating the hunting of migratory
birds. 10 8 The state of Missouri challenged the resulting federal
statute and regulations, claiming
that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution,
that there are limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power,
and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress
could not do unaided, in derogation
of the powers reserved
10 9
to the States, a treaty cannot do.
This argument Holmes rejected in certain terms. Noting
first that "[w]e do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power," Holmes nonetheless proclaimed that any qualifications "must be ascertained in a
different way" from determining the reach of federal authority
under the Constitution's grants of power in domestic matters.'1 0 Both the opinion and judgment make clear that this
"different way" is self-evidently more expansive. "It is obvious," Holmes continued, "that there are many matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of
Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such
an act could.""' It was no less obvious that regulating birds
was just such an exigent matter. In this way the Treaty Clause
readily supplied what the interstate Commerce Clause could
112
not.
How far this enhanced power extends is another matter.
But far. Or-what is more relevant here-furtherthan it does
in the domestic arena. For all the statutes it has invalidated
for exceeding federal authority, the Supreme Court has never
meted out the same fate to a treaty. Holland, in subsequently
repudiated dicta, goes so far as to hint that treaties need only
comport with the Constitution's procedural rather than substantive requirements. 113 Elsewhere, Holmes did suggest that
otherwise valid treaties may run afoul of the Constitution's express and presumably substantive provisions. 1 4 Conceivably
these might even include such states' rights protections as the
108. See id. at 431.
109. Id. at 432.
110. Id. at 433.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 435.
113. See id. at 433-34.
114. See id.
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Guarantee Clause. Yet, clearly, one type of limiting analysis
that deserves continuing interment is the notion that treaties
must deal only with matters of "international," that is external,
concern. Several factors prevent this idea from graduating into
a doctrine. In the first instance, the Supreme Court has never
adopted it. Nor could it without undoing innumerable treaties
that commonly deal with "internal" affairs. No less important,
just as the application of "interstate commerce" has expanded
in the last fifty years, so too has the scope of international law,
in no area more dramatically than international human
rights. 115 Even if, finally, the Court nonetheless applied the
"international concern" suggestion, Holland would still require
that any such limits be more distant than parallel limitations
on domestic powers. That means, among other things, that
whatever Lopez signifies for the interstate Commerce Clause,
any analogous restriction of the treaty power would have to be
correspondingly weaker.
Not that there is any such Lopez analog on the horizon.
Since (and even before) Holland, the Court has not offered any
hint that it would invalidate a treaty-or indeed international
agreements generally-for reaching matters not within the
treaty power. Professor Peter Spiro rightly points out that the
Senate has in effect restricted the reach of this power through
its questionable practice of making reservations to treaties, especially human rights treaties, the better to safeguard national
and state authority over certain traditionally "internal" affairs. 1 6 The Senate's ongoing perception that it needs to make
such reservations merely serves to underscore the general understanding that without them, the Supreme Court would do
nothing to stand in the way.
2.

W(h)ither Sovereignty?

No more on the foreign affairs horizon are there--or should
there be1 7 -- the judicially enforceable barriers of sovereignty
federalism. This gap comports with more nationalist orientation of foreign affairs law generally, the treaty power in particular. Just as that power expands federal authority that

115.
116.
117.

For a trenchant discussion, see HENKIN, supra note 105, at 196-98.
See Spiro, supra note 4, at 572-78.
See infra Part II.B.
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otherwise might not exist, sovereignty hurdles that enjoy at
least a tenuous existence on the national side remain unknown
on the international front. Not even a diluted analog to cases
such as National League of Cities, which directly created such
hurdles, or Printz, which accomplished the same task more
slyly, exists. What "sovereignty" barriers the Supreme Court
has recognized deal with the sovereignty of individuals rather
than political subunits.
At least in the context of international agreements, that
recognition came in modern form with Reid v. Covert.118 In this
sense, Reid was the foreign affairs counterpart to countless
cases upholding rights against domestic powers. In contrast to
those cases, the issue of individual rights limitations on foreign
affairs powers merits mention at all mainly because it illustrates just how extensive colorable-if erroneous-claims for
such powers may be. Reid resolved the issue in favor of rights.
At least five Justices agreed that neither international agreements nor measures implementing them could trump the Constitution's rights-bearing provisions.1 19 This conclusion meant
specifically that court-martial jurisdiction over civilians pursuant to an executive agreement with the United Kingdom nonetheless violated Article III, Section 2, as well as the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. More generally, the decision has helped
lay to rest expansive foreign affairs claims based on misreading
of the Treaty Clause 120 or on notions of inherent national sover2
eignty.' '
No parallel authority supports states' rights, at least as
embodied in nontextual or general notions of federalism. To
the contrary, dicta in Reid repudiates the idea. Justice Black's
plurality opinion expressly reaffirmed Holland, stating:
There is nothing in State of Missouri v. Holland which is
contrary to the position taken here. There the Court carefully noted that the treaty involved was not inconsistent
with any specific provision of the Constitution. The Court
was concerned with the Tenth Amendment which reserves
118.
119.

354 U.S. 1 (1957).
A plurality consisting of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black,

Douglas, and Brennan recognized this point expressly. See id. at 15-19. Justice
Frankfurter assumed it in a concurrence. See id. at 41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
120. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.

1999]

ARE WE TO BE A NATION?

1301

to the States or the people all power not delegated to the
National Government. To the extent that the United States
can validly make treaties, the people and the States have
delegated their power to the National
Government and the
1 22
Tenth Amendment is no barrier.
Justice Black did not fudge. Holland clearly stated that
"[t]he treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitionary words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is
whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the
general terms of the Tenth Amendment." 123 Ironically, Holmes
dismissed the idea of invisible radiations protecting states in
much the same way that many advocates of state sovereignty
scoff at the idea of "penumbras" and "emanations"124 safeguarding individuals. Instead, he wrote:
If we are to be accurate we cannot put the case of the State
upon higher ground than that the treaty deals with creatures that for the moment are within the state borders, that
it must be carried out by the officers of the United States
within the same territory, and that but for the1 25treaty the
State would be free to regulate the subject itself.
In this "accurate," radiation-free light, the Court had no difficulty concluding that "[n]o doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty
1 26
may override its power."
Nor has the Court suggested any retreat from its central
analysis about the longer reach of the treaty power and foreign
affairs authority more generally. Then again, a majority could
theoretically determine that principles of distributive federalism carve out exceptions to national power in international
matters, much as the Printz majority did with regard to commandeering domestically. Precedent aside, nothing stops the
Court from handing down an analog to Printz in foreign affairs.

122. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18.
123. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920).
124. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
125. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. Apart from Tenth Amendment radiations,
the Court also dismissed the assertion that Missouri had an exclusive title to migratory birds within its borders. See id.
126. Bradley, supra note 18, at 461.
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Nothing, that is, other than sound application of the standard
interpretive techniques questionably employed in Printz itself.
B.

UnexceptionableExceptionalism

Holland may yet be good law, but it may also be no better
than Printz. Holmes did not waste much time defending the
treaty power with close analysis of text, structure, or history, a
tack that at least on the surface seems even more imperious
than making the attempt poorly. He believed he could do this,
in part, by relying on the notion that foreign affairs powers derived not so much from ordinary constitutional interpretation
127
as from the exceptional requirements of national sovereignty.
Scholars have rightly called such a rationale into question, few
more effectively than Professor Curtis Bradley.'28 Given such a
basis, it might well follow that the commandeering exemption
in Printz-whatever its own problems-should modify the foreign affairs power of Holland rather than the other way
around, if for no other reason than the more recent decision
should prevail.
Such a conclusion, however, would be a non sequitur. Neither Holmes's Delphic performance, nor his reliance on "foreign
affairs exceptionalism," means that the principle Holland
enunciated cannot be justified. Standard interpretive techniques instead furnish ample material for a "revised opinion."1 29 As has been seen, the same cannot be said for the
doctrine against commandeering or the recent nascence of
states' rights more generally. What followed as a matter of
doctrine, therefore, also follows as a matter of interpretation.
So long as the current Court creates sovereignty limitations in
the language of absent federal powers, those limitations cannot
constrict enhanced federal authority in foreign affairs.
The Holmes opinion nonetheless merits consideration, and
not just because it is by Holmes. Rather, it illustrates a type of
justification for expansive foreign affairs authority that previous generations have too often advanced and that critics rightly
question. Recall that, for Holmes, Holland's central claim was

127.

See id. at 460.

128. See id. at 434-35, 440-41, 459-61.
129. Cf Louis Henkin, Shelly v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1963).
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that limitations on the treaty-making power "must be ascertained in a different way" from limitations on the power to
enact domestic statutes. 130 The answer lay in national sovereignty:
It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress
could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act
could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters
requiring national action, "a power which must belong to
and somewhere
reside in every civilized government" is not
131
to be found.
The opinion underscored this rationale when applying it to
the case at hand. In tones more reminiscent of Cassandra than
Olympus, Holmes wrote that with regard to migratory birds,
a national interest of very nearly the first, magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power.... We see nothing in the
Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a
food supply is cut off and
the protectors of our forests and
32
our crops are destroyed.
Holmes did suggest that even national exigency was not plenary, noting that the Court "[did] not mean to imply that there
are no qualifications to the treaty-making power." 33 It remains, however, that the opinion made no attempt to defend
enhanced treaty-making authority on the ground of textual
command, structural implication (besides, perhaps, the brute
fact that the United States is a sovereign country), or historical
understanding.
Certainly Holmes made no attempt to justify his justification on any of these grounds. That is, the Holland Court at no
point sought to argue that its conception of an exceptional
power inherent in national sovereignty-the rationale for a
comparatively expansive reading of the treaty power-was it-

130. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
131. Id. (citing Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)).
132. Id. at 435.
133. Id. at 433; see also Forrest Revere Black, Missouri v. Holland-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 25 ILL. L. REV. 911, 914-16 (1931); Thomas Reed Powell, ConstitutionalLaw, 1919-20, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1920).
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self a function of constitutional text, structure, or history. A
full critique of this failure is best left for other venues. Suffice
it to say that the doctrine must be conclusory to the extent that
it validates itself without reliance on other constitutional materials. Likewise, the doctrine is unsupported to the extent
those materials are examined, as witness the near-laughable
attempts to discover some interpretive basis for the doctrine by
Justice Van Devanter in United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport
Corp.3 4
On this much, both modern nationalists and states' rights
advocates can and should agree. Yet, perhaps ironically, nationalists have additional reasons for caution. One is that a
noninterpretivist doctrine such as exigent national sovereignty
authority almost necessarily cashes out in a highly restrictive
fashion. Return to Holmes. As if acknowledging the doctrine's
shaky basis, the Holland opinion repeatedly states that enhanced treaty-making authority should be implied only in the
rarest of occasions. It arises, suggested the Court, "where the
States are individually incompetent to act,"1 35 or "when a na1 36
tional interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved."
Even in our more environmentally aware times, the Court's effort to equate the fate of migratory birds with the fate of the
Republic seems a jarring attempt to puff up the facts to accord
with the test. This in turn leaves those remaining to make
sense of the case question whether the precedent lies in the
standard as articulated or as applied.
Yet the greater problem, at least from a nationalist viewpoint, is that Holland's problematic rationale undermines its
sound conclusion. It implies that the exigencies of national
sovereignty must support enhanced foreign affairs authority if
only because little else can. But in truth-and in contrast to
the states' rights revival-straightforward interpretive methods do furnish a compelling alternative basis. This point doubly applies given the appropriate constitutional burden of

134.

299 U.S.

304 (1936); see also THOMAS

M. FRANCK, POLITICAL

QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN

AFFAIRS? 14-18 (1992); HAROLD HONGJu KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION 94 (1990); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright

Export Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).
135. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
136. Id. at 435.
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proof. As critics of judicial activism never cease to preach, 137
the Court presumes that the President and Congress act constitutionally unless demonstrated otherwise. 8 This tenet may
or may not be honored in the breach when considering "prohibitionary words." 39 Even today, however, it still largely holds
when the Court considers whether the President or Congress
40
has exceeded its authority.'
Return, then, to the text. First of all, there is some. In
contrast to states' rights theories, expansive federal authority
with regard to treaty-making and corollary powers rests on
provisions that are express and on point. On one hand, those
clauses granting authority in this area are, on their face, as
broad or broader as any other such provisions in the document.
The Treaty Clause itself simply states that the President "shall
have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties."' 4 ' In fact the Supremacy Clause
famously-if misleadingly-implies that treaties may not need
to be made "in pursuance" of the Constitution at all. 4 2 Like-

137. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 1-11, 143-60 (1990) (advocating judicial restraint based

upon original understanding).
138. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 991 (1996) (statutes presumed
constitutional); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
(same); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901) (same).
139. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
140. The fact remains that since the New Deal the Court has very rarely invalidated statutes for exceeding constitutionally granted powers. Recently, of
course, there have been a few, and just a few, much heralded examples to the contrary. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
was beyond Congress's powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating aspects of the Gun-Free School Zones Act). Whatever excitement these
decisions may have generated in academic and in certain political circles, the
Court's fundamental stance of deference has yet to change.
141. "[P]rovided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
142. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. The argument proceeded from the negative inference that the text implied
that treaties need not be made "in Pursuance" of the Constitution since that requirement expressly applied only to "the Laws of the United States." See HENKIN,
supra note 105, at 185.
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wise, Congress may make "all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution" this power insofar as it
is "vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
1 43
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
Much has been written on limitations implied in either the
Treaty Clause or simply in the term "treaty."144 A number of
limitations are widely accepted yet effectively trivial. No one
questions that the power applies to treaties as defined in international law. Few would dispute that requirement, early on
articulated by Thomas Jefferson, that treaties not be pretextual but instead concern the nations that are part of a given
agreement. Of more relevance is the proposed limitation that
treaties relate to "international" matters rather than domestic
concerns. Whatever else can be said for this requirement, it
can be found nowhere in the Constitution's text. Even if it
could, the requirement would offer little comfort for the cause
of states' rights. While treaties have dealt with domestic matters for as long as the Republic has existed, never have they
done so more extensively than since the development of international human rights law after the Second World War. It may
be objected that such a change in degree-like the emergence of
a national industrial economy-could not have been foreseen at
the time the text was written and ratified. Barring a theory
that would also require the Court to return the nation to preDepression Commerce Clause jurisprudence, limitations to the
treaty-making power cannot be implied on the ground that the
legitimate scope of treaties has evolved along with much else.
Conversely, when the text does refer to the states in this
area, it proclaims the exclusivity of federal power in no uncertain terms. The first prohibition on state power that the Constitution specifies declares that "[n]o State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,"' 45 allowing only that a
state may enter an "Agreement or Compact" with a foreign
146
power subject to congressional approval.

143.
144.
145.
146.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
For an overview, see HENKIN, supra note 105, at 185-98.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c. 1.
See id. c. 3.
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A number of scholars have observed that a power does not
become limitless merely by virtue of being exclusive.147 This
observation is correct as far as it goes, though an outright prohibition on state authority does suggest that few limits on the
exclusive power will sound in states' rights. More importantly,
the observation misses a central point. Holland stands for the
proposition that federal treaty-making authority may be more
extensive than domestic powers, even under such ample grants
of power as the Commerce Clause. The exclusive grant of
treaty-making authority does nothing to undermine this contention when contrasted with domestic grants, which, even
with regard to commerce power, allow for the national and
148
state governments to exercise significant concurrent power.
Commandeering doctrine, moreover, is especially vulnerable to
this analysis since it is couched as an absence of a grant of
power rather than as a limit on power that might otherwise be
exercised. The more emphatic the express grant of power, the
more difficult it becomes to imply significant exceptions to that
grant.
Structural considerations lend Holland further support.
As with federalism, constitutional design provides limited
guidance when compared to other sources. In contrast to federalism, however, the guidance that structure offers is significant. There, the existence of a two-tiered form of government
may indicate that the lower level cannot be destroyed or fundamentally altered, but it suggests nothing about whether the
49
upper level can utilize officers to implement its policies.'
Here, built-in advantages that the states enjoy in federal decision making necessarily weaken arguments for other types of
limits on national authority and nowhere do so more clearly
than with regard to formal treaty making.
The states' built-in advantages have long been celebrated
under the banner of political process protections. According to
such eminent scholars as Herbert Wechsler 50 and Jesse Cho-

147. See Bradley, supra note 18, at 436; William E. Mikell, The Extent of the
Treaty-Making Power of the Presidentand Senate of the United States (Pt.II), 57
U. PA. L. REV. 528, 539-40 (1909).
148. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24
(1978) (setting forth the modern "dormant" Commerce Clause test for permissible
state regulation having interstate economic effects).
149. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
150. See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role
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per, 151 the Constitution principally safeguards state interests
not through judicially enforceable sovereignty federalism barriers, but through various mechanisms that give states a disproportionate voice in framing federal policy. The devices most
frequently mentioned included initial state authority over federal election districts, the Electoral College, and, most of all,
equal state suffrage in the Senate. This analysis famously afforded the Supreme Court its main rationale for rejecting sovereignty federalism limits in Garcia.152
Garcia notwithstanding, the celebration of political process
safeguards may well have been too boistrous. As Larry Kramer
has pointed out, some mechanisms-such as state control of
federal elections-have greatly diminished over time while the
effectiveness of others-such as the Electoral College-were
always overstated. 5 3 Garcia therefore remains correct not so
much because structural considerations obviate sovereignty
barriers as because those barriers themselves lack constitutional foundation. It follows that structure provides a similarly
limited justification for expansive federal authority in foreign
affairs to the extent that Washington makes policy through
congressional-executive agreements or by legislation implementing treaties when considered on its own footing. This is
not, however, to say that no justification exists. Equal Senate
suffrage, one of the Constitution's more undemocratic features,' 5 4 remains to give the states an unfair advantage even
here.
With treaties, however, the structural justification appears
with special force. Article II's supermajority requirement
means that one-third of the Senators plus one wields an effective veto on all formal treaties. The exclusivity of Senate advice and consent further means that only the branch that is
malapportioned out of deference to state borders participates in

of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
151. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980).

152. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 & n.11
(1985).
153. See Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1508-10 (1994).
154. See Suzanna Sherry, Our UnconstitutionalSenate, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 95 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford

Levinson eds., 1998).
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the process, to the exclusion of the proportionally democratic
House.'5 5 Holland-especially when narrowly read to apply to
federal treaty-making authority rather than foreign affairs
generally-thus makes sound structural sense. Whatever fears
states may have about ordinary legislative practices necessarily diminish given the advantage they enjoy in Senate approval
of treaties. In this way, allowing for a comparatively more expansive reading of treaty-making authority beyond domestic
authority directly follows the logic of constitutional design.
So too does it follow history-or at least so it appears
pending a full length scholarly inquiry. The qualification is
important. As noted, a credible historical account should comport with at least the most basic standards that historians
themselves pursue if the claim is to possess the external
authority for which it is invoked in the first place. 156 Apart
from not simply making things up, these standards at a minimum mean avoiding the usual lawyerly practice of rushing
straight to various primary documents for supporting quotations with little sense of the circumstances in which they were
first uttered. 157 By contrast, a plausible account should seek to

155. This feature in part accounts for the practice of submitting human
rights agreements as formal treaties rather than as executive agreements. See
Spiro, supra note 4, at 572-78.
156. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Flaherty, supra note
85, at 551-52.
157. An example directly relevant to the treaty debate is Thomas Jefferson's
Manual on ParliamentaryPractice, which he compiled while Vice President and
where he advances various limitations on the treaty power, including constraints
sounding in power reserved to the states. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, reprinted in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS
420 (Wilbur S. Howell ed., 1988). This document has received close scrutiny from
both nationalists, see HENKIN, supra note 105, at 189, as well as those more sym-

pathetic to federalism claims. See Bradley, supra note 18, at 415-16.
As almost any historian of the Founding would point out, the Manual-like

Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947)-is a highly problematic source for insight on the Founding. For starters, it was written over a decade after the Constitution's ratification. The passage
of time matters first because inferring attitudes backward over 10 years simply
assumes ideas remain static. This point applies with special rigor to the late
eighteenth century, a period in which American constitutional understandings

changed at a rate almost unparalleled before or since. See Flaherty, supra note
25, at 1774-75.

Moreover, Jefferson himself is among the most problematic of

Founders. Not only was he out of the country during the Federal Convention and
ratification debates, he was among the leading supporters of the Constitution
with perhaps the least sympathy for the Federalist ideas and assumptions that
the document reflected. But for Madison's persistent lobbying, he might well have
cast his lot with such Virginia Antifederalists as Patrick Henry and Richard
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reconstruct the general context in which specific constitutional
matters were considered, and only then attempt to examine
how those matters may or may not have been resolved. Constructing this type of historical claim takes more time than
lawyers care to invest, even given the not-so-shortcut of relying
on the work of actual historians rather than starting to rebuild
a given period from scratch. No surprise, then, that many lawyerly appeals to history receive not just mediocre but dismal
15 8
grades from historians themselves.
In this instance, the state of the available scholarship
compounds the problem. Today, anyone undertaking a goodfaith examination of domestic constitutional development during the Founding benefits from several generations of recent
historical work. Such historians as John Phillip Reid, Bernard
Bailyn, Edmund Morgan, Gordon Wood, and Jack Rakove have
done much to reconstruct the basic framework of constitutional
development with regard to internal issues between the independence and ratification. 159 The same does not hold for the
Constitution and foreign affairs, which remains comparatively
understudied. 160 This is not to say that the field lacks important and useful works,' 6 ' but that those works do not add up to
the same comprehensive picture. This difficulty, together with
the noted constraints of time and space, make any suggestions
advanced here less dispositive conclusions than invitations for
further work.

Henry Lee. Certainly, his reaction to the drift of the early Republic's government
to the perceived influence of Hamilton confirmed many of his doubts about the
Constitution having gone too far. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE
AGE OF FEDERALISM 257-302 (1993).

158. See Flaherty, supra note 85, at 552-55.
159. See id. at 535-49.
160. See generally William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the
Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997).
161. See generally FELIX GILBERT, TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF
EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1961); FREDERICK W. MARKS III,
INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. Scholarly Resources Inc. 1986) (1973); RICHARD B. MORRIS,
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED (1967); PAUL A. VARG, FOREIGN
POLICIES AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1963). The classic-and "primarily his-

torical"-work on the treaty power specifically predates these works, yet in many
ways both anticipates and accords with them. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL

SUPREMACY: TREATY POWER VS. STATE POWER (Peter Smith ed., 1965) (1913). I
am indebted to R.B. Bernstein for his guidance in this area.
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This much is safe. Nothing in the Founding record plainly
undercuts Holland-which is supported by text and structure-in part for the same reasons that nothing conclusively
supports Printz-which is not. Recall that, for the Founding
generation, federalism, at least on the domestic plane, remained a contested matter on even the most abstract level
when compared to other mechanisms such as separation of
powers. 162 Foreign affairs disagreements to varying degrees

echoed these differences. Nationalists, who almost necessarily
became Federalists, also tended to be internationalists. Hamilton, John Jay, Robert Livingston, and, for these purposes, the
Madison of the 1780s, fell into this category. States' rights advocates, who more often became Antifederalists, were inclined
to be isolationists. Richard Henry Lee, Elbridge Gerry, Hugh
Williamson, Arthur Lee, and Stephen Higginson, among others, made up this contingent. 163 To the extent that these domestic and foreign divisions reflected one another in
constitutional terms, the Founding provides only limited guidance on even the most general level.
But only to that extent. Scholarship and sources further
reveal a greater Founding commitment to nationalism in the
realm of foreign affairs that is entirely consistent with the
similarly greater commitment to nationalism under the treaty
power set forth in Holland. The outpouring of constitutional
history over the last several decades has emphasized the Founders' disenchantment with state government domestically as a
principal reason leading to the Federal Convention. In recovering this theme, historians have largely ignored, though
hardly challenged, another reason for the Constitution that
most of us learn in high school-that the national government
under the Articles of Confederation was hopelessly weak, especially in international affairs. Despite his own admitted emphasis on the problems of state government, one of the most
eminent historians of the period recently stated, "I have always
believed that both sets of problems-national and state-were
important to the reform of the national government in 1787."164

162. See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 177-78.
163. See MARKS, supranote 161, at 153-54.
164. Gordon S. Wood, "Motives at Philadelphia".A Comment on Slonim, 16
L. & HIST. REV. 553, 555 (1998). Wood's remarks, moreover, came in response to
a critique arguing that national-and thus, international--concerns played a
larger role than modern scholarship implies. See Shlomo Slonim, Motives at
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Scholars who have concentrated on foreign affairs during
this period disagree only as to whether national and international concerns played simply an important or dominant role.
As Frederick Marks argues, "foreign policy was not only important in shaping constitutional reform, but it was also of overwhelming significance."1 65

In particular, both direct and

indirect state actions handcuffed the nation's international relations in numerous ways, including failure to comply with
congressional requisitions for revenue, intrusion into military
matters, contradictory trade regulation, and, not least, treaty
violations. Individual texts, even iconic ones, should be employed with caution, but two are suggestive when taken in context. Madison's famous memorandum Vices of the Political
System of the United States devotes three of its eleven points to
problems within the states only after devoting the first eight to
the impotence of the Confederation in the face of state encroachments in national and foreign affairs. 66 Likewise, Madison, Jay, and Hamilton focused upon national weakness in
67
twenty-five of the first thirty-six essays in The Federalist.1
In many cases, the available historical materials do not
clearly point to conclusions that are much more precise than
the general context, but this is not one of them. Specifically,
the Founding concern with treaty violations sheds substantial
light on the proposition that the treaty power provides for assertions of domestic authority that the national government
may not otherwise exercise. This concern dated back to the nation's "first"168 international compact, the 1783 Treaty of Paris,
which ended the Revolutionary War and secured recognition of
American independence by Great Britain. Among other things,

Philadelphia, 1787: Gordon Wood's Neo-Beardian Thesis Reexamined, 16 L. &
HIST. REV. 527 (1998).

165. MARKS, supra note 161, at x. Marks continues: "Taken as a whole,
problems relating to the conduct of foreign affairs far outweighed any other combination of issues facing the Confederation. A more advantageous position vis-Avis the world was the overriding concern of the Federalists, the sine qua non of
political change." Id.
166. See THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF JAMES MADISON 57 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed., Univ. Press of New England
1981) (1973).

167. See MARKS, supra note 161, at 169-70.
168. "First" in the sense that, notwithstanding earlier treaties with France
and the Netherlands, for example, it took the peace treaty with Great Britain before the United States could claim undisputed international recognition as a sovereign nation.
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the Treaty obliged the United States to allow British merchants to collect prewar debts 169 and prohibited postwar confiscations of loyalist property. 17 0 Numerous state governments,
friends of neither British creditors nor loyalists, flouted these
provisions. These violations in turn provided the British government the legal basis for refusing to fulfill its own treaty obligations to withdraw from forts that effectively controlled the
Great Lakes and Ohio Valley. Confederation diplomats such as
John Adams were the first, but only the first, to realize that
this type of problem could never be solved so long as the Confederation Congress lacked the means to insure that the states
would abide by treaties.' 7 ' The nature of the violations at issue, moreover, made clear that enforcement would have to apply to matters-such as property and creditor-debtor law-that
even the most ardent nationalist viewed as quintessentially local.

169. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1784, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, 8
Stat. 80, 82 ("It is agreed that creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful
impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide
debts heretofore contracted.").
170. See id. art. V, at 82-83.
It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective states, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights and properties, which have been confiscated, belonging to
real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights and properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of his Majesty's arms, and
who have not borne arms against the said United States. And that persons of any other description shall have free liberty to go to any part or
parts of any of the thirteen United States, and therein to remain twelve
months unmolested in their endeavours to obtain the restitution of such
of their estates, rights and properties, as may have been confiscated; and
that Congress shall also earnestly recommend to the several states a reconsideration and revision of all acts or laws regarding the premises, so
as to render the said laws or acts perfectly consistent, not only with justice and equity, but with that spirit of conciliation, which on the return
of the blessings of peace should universally prevail. And that Congress
shall also earnestly recommend to the several states, that the estates,
rights and properties of such last mentioned persons shall be restored to
them, they refunding to any persons who may be now in possession the
bona fide price (where any has been given) which such persons may have
paid on purchasing any of the said lands, rights or properties since the
confiscation. And it is agreed, that all persons who may have any interest in confiscated lands, either by debts, marriage settlements, or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful impediment in the prosecution of their
just rights.
Id.
171. See MARKS, supra note 161, at 14-15.
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Federalist reformers had several ways to address this
problem. One was to make treaties-including treaties that
predated the new Constitution-the supreme law of the land
over state law and make them judicially enforceable. This the
Supremacy Clause expressly achieved. 17 2 That tack took care of
the Treaty of Paris problem specifically, since the Supreme
Court had no difficulty either in treating its relevant provisions
as self-executing or in concluding that its provisions trumped
contrary state law. 173 What Edward Corwin said long ago of
the Treaty itself applied no less to the decisions upholding it:
"What more impressive demonstration could be required of the
competence of the treaty-power to regulate relations that would
otherwise fall within the province of the States, and to displace
State authority in doing so?"174

Complementary demonstrations of national authority soon
followed. From its earliest years, the new Republic entered
into an array of treaties that likewise regulated matters that at
the time would have been seen as otherwise exclusively matters for the states. Consular conventions, for example, at least
from 1788, typically authorized foreign consuls to estates of deceased fellow nationals to exercise police power over their nation's vessels and crews docked in U.S. ports, and even to
adjudicate civil disputes arising between fellow nationals. 75
Treaties of reciprocal residency rights likewise trumped what
were clearly internal matters of state law by mandating that
foreigners could own property on the same terms as U.S. citizens.1 76 Extradition treaties, again from the nation's earliest
days, have done much the same in mandating that the signatory nations deliver foreign fugitives from the host country to
the country of the individual's citizenship for crimes committed
in either jurisdiction. 77 Insofar as Holland assumed that the
treaty power itself could exceed domestic grants of authority,
the history confirms that assumption.

172. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
173. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Ware v.
Hylton 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Brailsford v. Georgia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
174. CORWIN, supra note 161, at 63.
175. One such early example was a 1788 Consular Convention with France
concluded by none other than Jefferson. See CORWIN, supra note 161, at 84-86.
176. See id. at 86-91.
177. See id. at 91-95.
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Yet this solution did not address the problem of treaties
that dealt with matters ordinarily handled by state law but
that were not self-executing. Treaties of this sort also dated
back to the nation's early days. For this task, the Constitution
afforded Congress authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which augments federal authority not only for those
powers granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, but for "all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
1 78
the United States."

Congress may not have gotten around to this until as late
as 1829, with a statute implementing consular convention provisions, and then not in a significant way until 1848, with an
act dealing with extradition. 179 Corwin long ago explained the
delay. First, at least extradition treaties were "exceptional in
those early days."'80 In addition, the President commonly exercised the authority to implement treaties directly without the
aid of Congress.' 8' One further explanation arguably reflects
the practice that many early treaties affecting "internal" state
matters were straightforward enough to draft in self-executing
82
terms, as witness Article IV of the Treaty of Paris.
Moreover, to discount these factors and conclude that Congress lacks authority to enact laws necessary and proper to implement treaties only creates larger difficulties. Inferring a
constitutional absence of power from the failure to exercise a
power-especially absent an inquiry into the reasons for the
failure-leads to the same conclusory analysis that plagues
Printz. More importantly, such a conclusion leads to the structural anomaly that the President and two-thirds of the Senate
can make treaties that extend beyond domestic powers, and
that the President can implement them, but that a majority of
the national legislature, including the House as the most
democratic branch of government, has nothing to say on such
matters. Neither the Founding's general context, nor specific
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
179. Here I rely on Corwin. See CORWIN, supra note 161, at 277. 1 say
"may" pending the type of separate, fresh, full length historical treatment that
this topic deserves. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
180.

CORWIN, supra note 161, at 277.

181. The reason for early presidential implementation was less because
treaties were self-executing and so did not require implementing legislation than
because presidential implementation was seen as a ministerial duty that fell to
the Executive in the absence of congressional action. See id. at 278-80.
182. See supra note 169.
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evidence, indicates that this result in any way follows, much
less follows dispositively, from original understandings.
CONCLUSION
Elsewhere I have argued that federalism, at least in terms
of state sovereignty, has been a "backward-looking" doctrine
since its inception. Federalism was in large part an inheritance from their imperial past, and the Founders employed this
conception even as they marginalized it with much more effective innovations as separation of powers and direct representation to the capitol of their new continental empire. 183 This is
not to say that states' rights, whatever its wisdom or legitimacy, is not persistent. Holland would have remained that irrelevant curiosity that it was had not the Court resuscitated
states' rights.
Yet looking forward, Holland suggests that it will be
states' rights that at the end of the day will be reduced to irrelevance. Either the Court will take interpretation in this
area seriously and cabin the doctrine of its own accord. Or,
more likely, Holland and the commitment to foreign affairs
that it represents will do the job. As Barry Friedman has observed, the march of globalization cannot help but have an
overall nationalizing effect on our polity.8 4 In the end, the sovereignty of New Jersey simply makes less sense in the new
world order.

183.
184.

See Flaherty, supra note 26, at 1011-12.
See Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1471-82 (1998). Friedman allows, as do I, a role for multiple
layers of government in an increasingly internationalized world, but anticipates
that what will matter is local participation rather than "on the legal order and
questions such as whether Garciawill be overturned." Id. at 1482.

